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Abstract 
This paper develops a virtue ethical perspective on moral military behavior in relation to the 
infrastructural design of the military organization. To this end, Aristotelian virtue ethics is 
integrated with insights from social cognitive theory on moral behaviour and moral 
development and insights from sociotechnical systems theory on the design of organizations. 
This results in a normative theory on the design of the military organization to facilitate 
moral development and moral behaviour. This theory can yield new insights on the role of 
the organizational design in moral military behavior, as is demonstrated by applying it to 
casuistry taken from military operations in which the Netherlands participated: SFIR, 
UNPROFOR and ISAF.  
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Introduction  
During deployments, junior military leaders encounter situations that ask for moral 
deliberation and action (Groen junior leadership). In this paper I argue that, in order for them 
to deal with moral situations responsibly, these leaders should operate in an organizational 
context that facilitates the development and application of moral virtue, practical wisdom and 
technical skills, and that this is a design issue. More specifically my claim is that task design 
influences the possibilities for moral action and that military crisis response organizations can 
be designed in such a way as to support the moral behavior and moral development of 
military personnel. So far, little research has been done on how tasks should be designed to 
facilitate in moral functioning (Weaver 2006; exceptions are: Schminke 2001; James 2000; 
Achterbergh & Vriens 2010) although researchers claim that morality should be integrated 
into everyday organizational activities (Weaver et al. 1999; Tenbrunsel et al. 2003; Nyberg 
2007) and have called for more research on the role of the division of labour in moral 
functioning in organizations (Ford & Richardson 1994; Treviño et al. 2006; Craft 2013). This 
paper aims to increase our understanding of how the division of tasks affect moral (military) 
behavior by theorizing the relation between moral functioning and task design and applying 
this theory to casuistry drawn from military practice.  
To this end, the paper starts by developing a theoretical framework on facilitating 
moral behaviour and development in organizations based on Aristotle’s ethics (Aristoteles 
2005) and social cognitive theory. This results in an interactionist account of moral 
functioning, i.e., a perspective on moral functioning that considers moral behavior and moral 
development the result of an interaction of personal, situational and behavioral factors. Based 
on this interactionist account, requirements are formulated that organizations have to met in 
order to be conducive to the development of moral competence. Finally, Dutch socio-
technical systems theory is used to derive a set of design parameters for organizational 
structures (i.e., divisions of labour) that meet these requirements. I argue that organizational 
structures that are designed according to these parameters support moral functioning and by 
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extension, human flourishing (De Sitter 1994; Kuipers et al. 2010; Achterbergh & Vriens 
2010). These design principles apply to a variety of organizations, including the military.  
In order to demonstrate the usefulness of this theory, the second part of the paper 
presents two cases drawn from military operations (UNPROFOR and SFIR). Developed 
using a critical incident technique, these cases are analysed in light of the theoretical 
framework developed to demonstrate how moral development and responsible behavior is 
enabled or hindered in the context of crisis management operations. The first case 
(UNPROFOR) suggests a process of moral numbing as a result of small-scale, routine tasks 
and a lack of oversight on the aims and processes of the operation. The second case (SFIR) 
demonstrates how moral virtue and practical wisdom can be developed in tasks characterized 
by high regulatory potential, thus contributing to human flourishing. It results in 
‘anticipatory’ moral behavior, i.e., behavior aiming to prevent moral issues from occurring.  
By way of conclusion I reflect on the implications of this study for the military 
organization and organizational design for and in the context of crisis management 
operations. Currently, military organizations mix and match the various skills and equipments 
necessary to achieve operational goals. This creates opportunities to design organizational 
infrastructures that are supportive of moral behavior and moral development during military 
operations. Furthermore, processes of organizational redesign during deployments, which the 
casuistry demonstrates, may further improve or frustrate the possibilities for moral military 
behavior.  
 
1. Theoretical framework  
1.1. Human flourishing: Aristotelean virtue ethics 
Aristotle considers moral development and moral behaviour from within a teleological 
framework. His ethics is based on the question ‘what is the highest good for man?’. The 
highest good is that which we do for no other reason but for its own sake; it is an end in itself. 
Aristotle defines the highest good for human beings in terms of their internal organization 
and the characteristically human capacities resulting from this. The highest good for human 
beings is eudaimonia: ‘living a fulfilled life’ or ‘human flourishing’. The capacities that are 
characteristically human and that human beings should develop in order to live a fulfilled life 
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are reason (the capacity which disposes humans to know truth) and desire (the capacity which 
disposes humans to reach out for something perceived as good).  
Living a fulfilled life means that the capacities for reason and desire are developed and 
exercised in the best possible way. This happens in a process of habituation, for human 
beings are naturally disposed for reason and desire, but these capacities have to be developed 
into excellences. Habituation occurs when we develop our natural capacities into habits. If we 
develop our reason in the right direction, we will recognize as true that which is actually true 
and if we develop desire in the right direction, we will desire as good those things that 
actually are good. However, we can also habituate ourselves to consider as true things that 
are not true, and to desire things that are not good. For human beings then, living a fulfilled 
life consists of both developing our capacity for reason and desire into virtues and acting in 
accordance with those virtues.  
Being morally virtuous means that one desires the right things in specific situations. 
Aristotle emphasizes the situational nature of emotional responses. He argues that in specific 
situations we can have an emotional response that it too strong or too weak, and we should 
habituate ourselves to have an emotional response that is appropriate for the situation in 
which we find ourselves and that is neither an overreaction or underreaction. Thus, courage 
may be a virtuous response in one situation while being an overreaction in another. If we 
desire our capacity for desire in the right direction, we will be able to determine which 
emotional response is appropriate. This is also known as Aristotle’s theory of the mean.   
Living a fulfilled life occurs in human practice, and being morally virtuous and 
practically wise enables us to act well. Acting well is defined by the quality of the act as well 
as the quality of one´s character:  
‘...but if the acts that are in accordance with the excellences have themselves a 
certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The 
agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he 
must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for 
their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and 
unchangeable character’ (Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1105a28-1105b). 
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Aristotle here lists three requirements that have to be met in order for an act to be virtuous. A 
person has to desire the right thing and choose to do this. One has to be both morally virtuous 
and practically wise in order to act morally responsible. Being morally virtuous means that 
one desires the right thing for its own sake and because it is the right thing to do. What is the 
right thing to do is relative to the particular situation, and being practically wise enables one 
to know which act best fulfils the desire (Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, 1105a28-1105b).  
 Therefore, if an organization aims to encourage moral behavior and moral 
development, it should encourage the development of moral character, moral virtue and 
practical wisdom in relation to the application of job-related skills. To this end, it should 
enable the habituation of reason and desire into excellences and to apply them in practice, 
i.e., while doing one’s job.  
 
 
Figure 1: Aristotelean virtue ethics on moral behavior  
 
The development of moral virtue and practical wisdom occurs through repeated actions and 
feedback from others. Others are important examples for our behavior, especially the 
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‘practically wise’ person; he is the standard against which Aristotle discusses what is the 
right thing to do.  
<<this section on moral development needs to be developed further still>> 
 
Figure 2: Process of moral development according to Aristotles (Achterbergh & Vriens 2010, 
p.343) 
 
1.2. Moral functioning: social cognitive theory  
Aristotles’ ethics builds on a moral psychology that emphasizes a process of moral 
development through experience, emulation, and feedback. For this reason, it has often been 
characterized as an ethics which centers on ‘becoming by doing’. Present day studies in the 
field of social cognitive theory deepen our understanding of the psychological processes 
involved in the development of moral virtue and practical wisdom, in particular, theory on 
moral identity (Narvaez & Lapsley 2009; Blasi 2005; Aquino & Reed 2002), moral 
motivation (Hardy & Carlo 2005) and ethical expertise (Dreyfus & Dreyfus 2004; Narvaez & 
Lapsley 2005; Hulsey & Hampson 2014; Dane & Sonenshein 2014). In terms of social 
cognitive theory, human flourishing consists of the development of moral identity, moral 
motivation and ethical expertise and is threathened by moral disengagement.  
 Two assumptions of social cognitive theory are especially relevant for my account. 
First, according to social cognitive theory, cognitive development is an interactionist process, 
in which training, practical experience and emulation play an important role. When applied to 
moral functioning, social cognitive theory sees the development of moral capacities as the 
Habituation 
Practical wisdom 
Moral virtue 
Acting well  
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result of interactional processes between the person, his environment and behavior. Through 
processes of acting, observing and reflection, and through training and education, people 
develop moral schemes that affect and shape their functioning in the moral domain. Put 
different, social cognitive theory, like Aristotle, characterizes moral development as 
‘becoming by doing’. Second, according to social cognitive theory, people are naturally 
inclined towards self-consistency and the avoidance of negative affect (Bandura 1977). As a 
result, people are motivated to act in accordance with their self-image in order to avoid self-
sanctions.  
 
Ethical expertise  
People develop moral capacitities through their own actions and trainings, as well as 
observing and emulating moral behavior from others. In this process, people may develop 
‘ethical expertise’, which is extensive knowledge of moral values and ethical theories and the 
ability to justify moral claims convincingly (‘epistemic expertise’) as well as the ability to 
apply moral knowledge in practice and to perform moral tasks well (‘performative’ expertise) 
(see Steinkamp et al. 2008). In the remainder of this paper, the focus is on performative 
ethical expertise, which is also referred to as moral competence. Moral competence may 
pertain to live in general or to specific professional practices (Dane & Sonenshein 2014).  
The development of ethical expertise consists of the develoment of ‘moral schemes’ 
(Lapsley & Hill 2008). Schemes are general knowledge structures that structure information, 
expectations and experiences (Narvaez & Lapsley 2005; Lapsley & Narvaez 2004). They 
enable the interpretation of situations and facilitate the processing of situational clues to 
determine an appropriate course of action. Which schemes someone develops depends in part 
on his identity, experiences, goals and self-image, while the development of schemes 
contributes to and reinforces the actor’s identity, self-image, goals and experiences; it is a 
self-reinforcing process. Schemes may become ‘chronic’, meaning that they are readily 
accessible and prominent in someone’s knowledge structure (Narvaez et al. 2006).  
Moral schemes are focused on the moral domain, and consist of moral convictions 
orientations, categories as well as moral goals, values, personality characteristics and 
principles and guidelines for behavior (Narvaez & Lapsley 2005). A moral scheme influences 
moral awareness, judgment, movation and action. If a moral scheme is used often, it is 
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developed further and becomes more complex. In addition, it is easily accessible and as a 
result, situations are seen and intepreted in light of this scheme. People with elaborate moral 
schemes that are chronically accessible, are considered ´moral chronics´. They are likely to 
perceive themselves primarily in terms of this moral schemes, in other words; they have a 
strong moral identity.  
In the development of ethical expertise, experiences of the self and of others play an 
important role. Others serve as rolemodels, trainers, teachers and commentators. The 
behaviors of others and their consequences, especially in terms of sanctions and rewards, 
provides valuable information on which behavior is morally permissible and results in 
desired outcomes. Through emulation, people develop their own insight in the outcomes of 
behaviors. In addition, others provide feedback on our behavior and if these are reflected 
upon, this may also result in moral development. A requirement for moral development is the 
interaction with others and the ability to see the consequences of one’s actions.  
 
Moral identity 
Moral identity has been discussed from a characterological and a socialcognitive perspective 
(Shao et al. 2008). The discussion in the previous section on moral expertise is a 
socialcognitive account of the development of a moral identity; someone whose moral 
scheme is chronically accessible is thought to have developed a moral identity that is central 
to his self-image.  
A characterological perspective on moral identity emphasizes the way this identity 
motivates everyday moral behavior (Blasi 2005; Blasi 2004). Willpower, integrity and moral 
desire are the core virtues of a moral identity. Willpower consists of self-control and 
perseverance and enables someone to resist tempation and to remain focused on moral goals. 
Integrity concerns the need for unity and consistency in the self-image and motivates people 
to act in accordance with their moral identity. Finally, moral desire is the element of the 
moral character that concerns morality. It is the intensity with which someone is focused on 
realising moral goals.  
Moral desire gives direction to willpower and integrity. A high level of moral desire 
contributes to consistent moral behavior based on an intrinsic motivation. This conception of 
moral identity is closely related to the Aristotelean account of moral character and clarifies 
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how mental processes and individual characteristics such as integrity and willpower enable 
consistent moral behavior.  
 
Moral motivation 
Moral motivation has to be distinguished from moral desire, which refers to the intensity with 
which someone is focused on realising the good. Moral desire is an aspect of moral identity, 
whereas moral motivation is the result of an internalised moral desire (Blasi 2005). Moral 
motivation has been perceived as a step in the moral decision making process (Rest 1986). As 
such it refers to the decision of an individual to act in accordance with his moral judgment, 
thereby linking moral judgment to moral action. Moral motivation requires prioritizing moral 
goals over other, non-moral goals. 
From a personality perspective, moral motivation (also: moral will) is a characteristic 
of the individual and concerns the extent to which someone is generally motivated to act on 
his moral judgment. As such, it is related to moral identity and moral expertise. It is assumed 
in social cognitive accounts of moral functioning that moral expertise and the prominence of 
someone moral identity in his self-image contribute to moral motivation, thereby increasing 
the likelihood that someone will behave in accordance with his moral convictions and 
judgments. As a characteristic of the individual, moral motivation is the motvation to act in a 
moral responsible manner (Tanner & Christen 2014). It is an aspect of moral identity; people 
may differ in their moral motivation. Moral motivation is positively related to moral 
awareness, moral judgment and moral action; a high level of moral motivation is more likely 
to result in moral responsible behavior. Furthermore, moral motivation affects the willingness 
of the individual to reflect on a situation in moral terms, to formulate a moral judgment and 
to act in accordance with this judgment in spite of diffulties or resistance (Tanner & Christen 
2014).  
 
Implications  
The three concepts discussed above paint a picture of moral functioning that is closely related 
to a virtue ethical perspective on moral functioning. It prioritizes the role of moral 
competence and personality in moral behavior. Moral development is perceived as a self-
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reinforcing process; moral identity, moral expertise and moral motivation are closely linked 
and are mutually reinforcing.  
 
1.3. Synthesis: requirements for organizations 
Based on the above discussion of virtue ethics and sociocognitive theory, a set of general 
requirements for organizations can be developed that have to be met in order to facilitate 
moral behavior and moral development.  
An organizational environment is conducive to moral behavior and development if it 
enables people  
(1) To encounter a variety of moral situations;  
(2) To witness the moral behavior of others and their consequences in terms of 
outcomes, rewards and punishments;  
(3) To deal with moral situations themselves and to see the outcomes of their own 
actions; 
(4) To reflect on their own moral behavior and that of others;   
(5) To act in accordance with their moral desire.  
In the next section, I elaborate what organizational structure may realize these requirements 
by drawing on the Dutch Modern Sociotechnical Approach.  
 
2. Sociotechnical systems theory 
The Dutch Modern Sociotechnical Approach (MST) as developed by De Sitter (De Sitter 
1994; Achterbergh & Vriens 2010) assumes that organizational functioning is defined by the 
level of coherence between the design of the structure and systems of an organization and 
social variables (attributes of human beings and their relations) (Van Amelsvoort 1999, p.10). 
MST perceived of human beings as socially referential beings, that is to say the needs of 
human beings are defined or activated in human interactions. Since the organizational 
structure defines the working relations between different tasks which are occupied by specific 
people, they also influence the possibilities for behaviour (Van Amelsvoort 1999: 45). This is 
in line with the interactionist perspective on moral functioning advocated by Aristotelian 
virtue ethics and sociocognitive theory. MST adds to this an organizational perspective. More 
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specifically, it focuses on the way the organizational structure influences interaction between 
human beings and their abilities for specific behavior.  
MST was developed by De Sitter (De Sitter 1973; De Sitter 1994; De Sitter et al. 
1997). He developed a set of design parameters for the structure of the organization. In this 
paragraph I will first discuss the philosophy underlying MST, i.e., its cybernetic origins, its 
view of human beings, its concept of complexity and of alienation. These provide the 
background against which we are to understand De Sitter’s design parameters and his claim 
that the value of these parameters should be ‘as low as possible’.  
Two core concepts in MST are complexity and controllability. The organization is 
perceived as a dynamic network of mutually dependent, interacting humans and machines. 
The complexity of an organization is a factor of the number of elements, the number of 
relations, the stability and specificity of those relations (Van Amelsvoort 1999). An 
organization with many elements and many relations between those elements is more 
complex than an organization with few element and few relations between those elements. 
Complexity is positively related to the sensitivity for interferences, which in turn is 
negatively related to the controllability of the organization (Amelsvoort 1999: 43). 
Controllability refers to the ability of an organization to deal with disturbances effectively 
and to realize its aims. This requires attenuation (a reduction of the sensitivity for 
disturbances) and amplification (the increase of regulatory potential in order to deal with 
disturbances).  
According to De Sitter, an organizational structure can be source for disturbances and 
regulatory potential. It should be designed so as to attenuate and amplify, thereby enabling 
the organization to realize its aims. Generally, attempts to reduce the sensitivity for 
interferences add rules and procedures to the organization, thus increasing its complexity. In 
MST this is referred to as the ‘vicious circle of the division of labour’. MST attempts to end 
this cycle by emphasizing the importance of complex jobs in simple organizations. Rather 
than adding complexity to the organization, the complexity of the organization should be 
reduced and regulatory potential of individuals within the organization should be increased.  
 
2.1. Design Parameters for the division of labour  
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De Sitter develops design parameters capturing characteristics of organizational structures 
relevant for attenuation and amplification (Achterbergh & Vriens 2009: 242). He is 
concerned with the controllability of organizations. He distinguishes 7 design parameters that 
define the organizational structure. These parameters can be clustered together into 
parameters that (1) describe the production structure, (2) regard the separation between the 
production and control structure, and (3) regard the control structure of the organization. 
They can be summarized as follows:  
Parameters for the production structure:  
1. Level of functional concentration relative to orders. Functional concentration: the 
extent to which operational tasks are concentrated into specialized departments, 
where they are performed with respect to (potentially) all orders. If the value of 
functional concentration is low, this means that the operational tasks required for 
realizing an order are grouped together in production flow.  
2. Level of differentiation of operational transformations in tasks: De Sitter 
distinguished making, preparing and supporting as operational sub-transformations. 
Operational sub-transformations can be grouped into separate tasks, or they can 
integrated into operational tasks.  
3. Level of specialization of operational transformations in tasks: this parameter refers 
to how much tasks are split up into small sub-tasks. One task can be separated into 
several subtasks. If the level of specialization is high, this means that a task is split up 
into many small sub-tasks. If, in contrast, the level of specialization is low, sub-
transformation of a transformation are integrated into one task.  
Regarding the separation between the production and control structure, this parameters is 
developed:  
4. Level of separation of operational and regulatory transformations in tasks: the level 
of separation is high if the regulatory tasks are separated from the operational tasks; 
operational tasks are grouped together and stripped from their regulatory potential, 
and operational tasks are grouped together and stripped from their operational 
aspects. Separation is minimal if a tasks consists of both operational sub-
transformations and the related regulatory transformations.  
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Regarding the control structure of the organization, De Sitter formulates these design 
parameters:  
5. Level of differentiation into aspects of regulatory transformations in tasks: De Sitter 
distinguishes three types of regulation: regulation by design, strategic regulation and 
operational regulation. The differentiation of regulatory transformation is maximal if 
these three types of regulation are grouped into different tasks, i.e., if strategic, 
operations and regulation by design are separate tasks).  
6. Level of differentiation into parts of regulatory transformations in tasks: De Sitter 
assumes that all regulatory transformations consists of monitoring, assessing and 
acting. If regulation is differentiated into three parts and if these sub-transformation 
are coupled with separate regulatory tasks, differentiation is maximal.  
7. Level of specialization of regulatory transformation in tasks; this is about the extent 
to which regulatory transformation are split up into separate tasks (Achterbergh & 
Vriens 2009: 242-248). 
De Sitter states that the value of all the parameters should be as low as possible. If this is the 
case, controllability is high. As a result, the organization will realize a high quality of work, 
high quality of organization and high quality of working relations. Such an organizational 
structure can be characterized as ‘complex jobs in simple organizations’, as opposed to 
‘simple jobs in complex organizations’. His logic is explained below and then applied to 
moral functioning in organizations.  
 
2.2. A structure with ‘low’ parameter values (this section needs elaboration) 
An organizational structure characterized by ‘high’ parametersvalues, is a structure with high 
levels of specialization, differentiation, separation and functional concentration. It consists of 
a complex network of small tasks. The tasks are characterized by their limited regulatory 
potential, few possibilities for learning and few opportunities for interaction. In contrast, an 
organizational structure that is designed according to ‘low’ parameters values, can be 
described as a simple structure with complex tasks. Such a structure offers opportunities for 
growth and learning, meaningful work, active participation in organizational developments, 
and social interaction. Below I explain why this is the case. 
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In an organizational structure characterized by low parameter values, the primary 
process is organized into homogeneous, parallel streams focused on the production of one 
type of order. Within these streams, tasks are performed in relation to specific order types, 
i.e., for specific input-output combinations. Parallel streams can be partitioned into segments 
that are assigned to taskgroups (Achterbergh & Vriens 2010; De Sitter 1994) and taskgroups 
are responsible to realize specific products. When differentiation is low, tasks include 
preparing, making and supporting functions, and low specialisation results in large, complex 
tasks as opposed to small and short-cycled tasks. Such tasks create room to deal with 
problems that occur whilst working; since the tasks are large and more complex, they allow 
for flexibility and are thereby able to absorb disturbances. They also allow for learning, since 
people are responsible for solving problems and can see the effects of their actions. This 
feedback contributes to their learning process. In addition, employees have insight and 
oversight over the production process to which they are contributing, and as a result they are 
able to see the effect of their own and others’ actions.   
When the controlstructure has been designed according to low parametervalues, 
controltasks have a low level of separation, differentiation and specialization. In combination 
with low values on the fourth parameter, the separation of control and production, then tasks 
consist of both control and production aspects. There is no separate, hiërarchical 
controlstructure. Employees have the regulatory potential to deal with problems when they 
occur, rather than having to ‘pass on’ the problem to other tasks or having to rely on an 
extensive, complex control structure to resolve the problem. When problems can be dealt 
with at the level at which they occur, they can be dealt with more effectively and more 
efficiently.  
When the differentiation of regulatory tasks is low, strategic, design and operational 
regulation is integrated into one task. When separation is low, tasks encompass the ability to 
monitor, assess and act. As a result, the domain of regulatory tasks increases, since they are 
concerned with several aspects and levels of regulation. This is reinforced with the low level 
of specialisation.  
Other outcomes of low parameter values:  
- People are able to deal with disturbances effectively, either within their own task or 
in collaboration with their network of tasks;  
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- Disturbances are dealt with quicker, because this can happen at the level at which the 
disturbance occurs.  
- Employees can contribute to product and process innovation 
- Complex, rich tasks are challenging and contribute to commitment;  
- Stress is reduced because employees are able to deal with problems they encounter.  
- Increased insight in the process and the contribution of a task to the larger process 
contributes to feelings of motivation and commitment.  
(This section is still under construction.)  
 
2.3. Relating the design parameters to moral behavior  
In this paragraph, the design parameters as developed by De Sitter are related to the 
requirements for organizations that facilitate moral functioning listed above. I argue that if an 
organization is designed according to low parameter values, it will facilitate moral 
responsible behavior and moral development. It enables people:  
1. To encounter a variety of moral situations. The complexity of the task is increased, 
and as a result, employees may encounter a variety of task related problem. These 
will include moral issues and situations calling for moral action.  
2. To witness the moral behavior of others and their consequences in terms of 
outcomes, rewards and punishments. In an organizational structure characterized by 
low parameter values, people are most likely working in groups and are collectively 
responsible to realize the final product or service. The work requires and allows for 
close collaboration and interaction. In this process, people will witness the behavior 
of others and its effects. This contributes to the development of moral schemes.  
3. To deal with moral situations themselves and to see the outcomes of their own 
actions. Since employees have broad, complex tasks that contain regulatory potential, 
they are able to deal with problems themselves or to resolve them in their network of 
tasks. The regulatory circle is complete, which means that people are able to monitor, 
assess and intervene in situation. This means that all steps of the moral decision 
making process, moral awareness, moral judgment and moral action, can be taken. In 
addition, given the complexity of tasks, people can act on a complex understanding 
of the situation; they are aware of multiple aspects of a situation and how their 
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actions may contribute to it. This will contribute to the quality of moral decision 
making, since it is based on a complex understanding of the moral issue. Repeated 
experiences with moral decision making contribute to moral development.  
4. To reflect on their own moral behavior and that of others. In order to reflect on 
others’ behavior, one has to be able to see that behavior and to see its outcomes. In 
simple structures with complex tasks, employees can see the effects of their moral 
actions, as well as the effects of others’ actions. In addition, given the scope and 
complexity of their task, people are able to respond to situation in a variety of ways. 
Both aspects contribute to the further development of moral schemas and moral 
competence. The behavioral repertoire can expand and insights in the effects of 
behavior on other can be extended.  
5. To act in accordance with their moral desire; this is closely related to point 3. If tasks 
contain a full regulatory circle, this means that people are enabled to act in 
accordance with their assessment of what is best in the given situation. They are 
motivated to do their work and committed rather than alienated (De Sitter 1994). 
This commitment and motivation will also affect their moral behaviors; given the 
fact that people are responsible for more aspects of their work and that they can see 
the effects of their work on others, they are also more likely to be motivated to do the 
best they can.  
To summarize,  organizations aiming to facilitate moral development and moral 
behavior are best organized in such a way that people have complex tasks (or: ‘rich jobs’ as 
Achterbergh and Vriens (2010) refer to them). Such tasks allow for a variety of experiences, 
the development and improvement of moral skills and insights. They also encourage moral 
actions because people are made responsible for the entire cycle of decision making.  
This finding is in line with claims in the literature. For example, Treviño (1986) argues 
that complex tasks allow for role-taking, thereby encouraging moral behavior. Based on 
Jones’ Issue-Contingent Model (Jones 1991), it can be argued that complex tasks are likely to 
contribute to a high perceived moral intensity of situations (Gulpers, forthcoming).  
 
 
3. Cases 
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In order to demonstrate the usefulness of the theory developed, it is now applied to three 
cases drawn from encounters that Dutch military personnel had with with moral situations 
during their deployment in international crisis management operations. In this paper, three 
cases will be presented and analysed using the theoretical framework developed above. The 
cases demonstrate how moral development and responsible behavior are enabled or hindered 
in the context of crisis management operations by the organizational design.  
The first case (UNPROFOR) suggests a process of moral numbing as a result of small-
scale, routine tasks and a lack of oversight on the aims and processes of the operation. The 
second case (ISAF) shows that moral behavior can be expressed as acts of protest and 
defiance when the organizational structure does not facilitate actions in accordance with 
one’s sense of moral responsibility, professional skills and expertise. This may result in an 
informal redesign of the organization. The final case (SFIR) demonstrates how moral virtue 
and practical wisdom can be developed in tasks characterized by high regulatory potential, 
contributing to human flourishing. One of the effects is ‘anticipatory’ moral behavior, i.e., 
behavior aiming to prevent moral issues from occurring.  
 
3.1. Method 
To develop these cases, secondary empirical data was analysed using a critical incident 
technique. For two of the cases (SFIR and UNPROFOR), a large database of interviews with 
Dutch veterans was accessed and the search tool was used to find interviews in which an 
ethical issue or contronting situation was recounted (Scagliola 2010; van den Berg et al. 
2010). The search focused on military operations since the end of the Cold War. Interviews 
matching the criteria were carefully examined to develop insights on the moral issue 
encountered, the way the soldier involved dealt with it, and the organizational context in 
which he operated. Additional interviews with veterans who were part of the same 
deployment were examined to deepen insights in the mission, the organizational context and 
moral behaviour and development during that deployment. Next, general information on the 
military operations was collected, using previous empirical studies, commemorative books, 
scientific publications and websites. By combining these insights, the cases were developed. 
The analysis of the cases focuses on moral functioning and the organizational context.   
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3.2. Discussion of the cases  
For each of the cases, a description will be given of the mission’s aims, the ‘protagonist’, the 
moral issue(s) encountered, the way it was dealt with and the organizational context in which 
this occurred.  
  
3.2.1. Case 1: Moral disengagement and numbing in UNPROFOR (DutchBat II) 
This case recounts the experiences of DutchBat II, who were deployed to Srebrenica, Bosnie 
Herzegovina from July 1994 – January 1995.
1
 DutchBat’s task was to minimalise hostilities 
between the parties to the conflict by manning observation posts and performing patrolles on 
foot and by car. In addition, DutchBat was to contribute to the improvement of the 
infrastructure and living conditions in the enclave in collaboration with MSF, UNHCR and 
ICR (Jansen et al. 1999). In this case I focus on the experiences at one of the observation 
posts and the experiences of an engineer.  
Tango-Two was a permanent observation post, located at the border of the enclave. 
The building was located in a house on the side of a road that separated Serbs and Muslims. 
On one hand, the building overlooked the road, and on the other hand, it overlooked a valley. 
From this post, Dutch soldiers performed patrols. They also worked at the further 
development and maintenance of the observation post. And they were responsible for 
monitoring the valley and the entrance to the enclave. When on watch duty, soldiers 
overlooking the road had to count the number of cars entering the enclave. The lists had to be 
handed in, but the soldier who recounts his experiences is unaware of what the lists were used 
for or who they were given to. While overlooking the valley, this group commander 
experienced a harrowing situation; he witnessed the execution of locals in the valley. He 
reported this incident to his superior, but the response was that he most have seen this wrong, 
that it did not happen. This commander reports feeling that his observations were not used by 
others, that the reports of his patrol were not acted on. Over time, and after encountering 
multiple difficult situations, the soldiers at this post lost their faith in the mission. They 
experienced time and again that they could not do anything and that their superiors did not 
                                                 
1
 For the development of this case, several sources were used, including books and reports on 
DutchBat II (Vogelaar et al. 1997; Kramer 2007; Vogelaar et al. 2005; Jansen et al. 1999). In addition,  
interviews from the interviewproject Nederlandse Veteranen were used (Scagliola 2010). 
19 
 
act either. They experience a sense of impotence and meaninglessness. This resulted in 
irresponsible behavior, such as harrassing of local population and fysical abuse.   
The second case that sheds light on the role of the division of labour in DutchBat II 
are the experiences of an engineer. He was responsible for the maintenance of observation 
posts, for the repair of roads, supplying the observation posts and the processing of waste. 
This engineer was extremely motivated to work, although the working and living conditions 
were harsh. During his daily work, he has many encounters with the local population and 
witnesses their hardship. At the same time, he is unable to help them; his only responsibility 
is to fix the road. When he is processing waste (which entails transporting waste of the 
observation posts and dumping it in a ravine), he is confronted with starving locals, who 
climb on his truck to shift through the waste for food and valuables. Over time, his situation 
is becoming more problematic. As a soldier, he considers it his responsibility to protect these 
people, but he finds that he cannot. He can hardly survive himself. Over time, he starts to see 
the locals as sub-humans, who are sifting through waste in order to survive. The only way he 
can cope with this situation is by morally disengaging (Bandura et al. 1996).  
In both cases, a process of moral decline can be observed. The lack of options to deal 
with the moral situations encountered, which are due to a lack of regulatory potential, but 
also to the extreme situations these soldiers encounter and the harsh living conditions, results 
in moral numbing and moral disengagement. They are not able to act in accordance with their 
moral motivation and desire.  
 
3.2.2. Case 2: Moral growth in SFIR  
The final case focuses on the experiences of a compound commander deployed in SFIR. His 
taks is characterized by a high level of regulatory potential; he is responsible for a variety of 
tasks, oversees the entire process of the compound. As a result, he feels responsible for the 
well-being of the soldiers stationed there. He develops several initiatives to improve life at 
the compound, including the creation of a fire-squad and measures to ensure that no strangers 
can come into the compound. Thereby he attempts to prevent that a child wired with a bomb 
will enter the compound, knowing that his men will experience a moral dilemma when 
confronted with a child soldier. He has the regulatory potential to deal with this problem, 
even before it occurs. He can monitor developments in the mission (more attacks against the 
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allied forces and the use of children in bomb attacks), assess likely problematic events (a 
child soldier entering the compound with a bomb, and hesitance of his soldiers to react) and 
acts to prevent this from happening (expanding the security parameters around the camp). 
This can be referred to as ‘anticipatory morality’.  
This commander reports a process of personal, professional and moral growth during 
his mission. His moral identity is strenghtened, he is able to further develop his moral 
thinking and to act on it. This can in part be explained by the fact that his job is a ‘rich job’; it 
is a complex job with a high level of regulatory potential. He is able to set his own goals, to 
redesign the organization (in this case: the functioning of the compound), to deal with 
problems he encounters. His motivation is high throughout the operation and he takes on 
several opportunities to initiate new   
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper, I developed a theoretical framework that relates moral functioning to 
organizational design. A moral and psychological perspective on moral functioning were 
integrated to define general requirements that have to be met by organizations to facilitatie 
moral development and moral behavior. Next, De Sitter’s design principles were used to 
logically derive which organizational structures are likely to meet these requirements. The 
resulting design theory was applied to casuistry drawn from military practice. The cases 
demonstrate that organizational structures that consists of small tasks are likely to affect the 
motivation of personnel, their ability to recognize moral issues and their willingness to 
respond in a moral responsible manner. It may contribute to processes of moral 
disengagement and moral numbing, which ultimately may result in immoral behavior and 
even moral degradation. Tasks that are characterized by high levels of complexity and 
responsibility in contrast, provide opportunities for moral growth and anticipatory morality.  
This study has several limitations. The casuistry was developed using secondary 
empirical data, which means that information on the design of the organization was mainly 
derived from additional, general information on the mission. It is well known in literature that 
the formal organizational design is often not the reality of the organization. An organizational 
structure develops over time through negotiation, job crafting and formal redesign amongst 
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others. Such processes of organizational development may have occurred in the cases 
studied. 
Furthermore, the organizational structure is merely a startingpoint for developing 
organizational infrastructures that facilitate moral behavior and moral development. A 
complete infrastructure includes the organizational structure, human resources and the 
systems for their management and technology and tools (Achterbergh & Vriens 2010). 
Therefore, additional research has to be done in which other aspects of the organization are 
included as well.   
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